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et al.: Case Summaries

CASE SUMMARIES

PURE GIFT TRANSFERS OF NONRECOURSE DEBT CONSTITUTE INCOME TO DONOR. EstateofLevine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1980).
The taxpayer gave property to a trust to benefit his grandchildren.
Previously, the taxpayer, Levine, had obtained $780,000 from two nonrecourse, nonpurchase money mortgages secured by the property. The trust
assumed the mortgages, accrued interest on the mortgages, and personal
debts of the taxpayer. Because personal debts of the taxpayer were discharged, the transaction was part sale and part gift.
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929), had
established that discharge of personal debts constitutes income to the donor.
The IRS argued that discharge of the nonrecourse mortgages and accrued
interest also constituted income to the taxpayer under Crane v. Commissioner,
331 U.S. 1 (1947). In Crane, the Court held that the excess of nonrecourse
mortgages discharged in an outright sale of encumbered property over the
taxpayer's adjusted basis in that property constituted taxable gain. The adjusted basis was calculated by including the amount of the nonrecourse mortgages less depreciation deductions taken by the taxpayer. The IRS argued
that Craneshould apply to all transactions in which nonrecourse mortgages
are discharged, including the part sale, part gift transaction in Levine.
Conversely, Levine argued that the "net gift" theory of Turnerv. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'dpercuriam,410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969),
precluded application of Craneto the part sale, part gift transaction. In Turner,
the taxpayer made gifts that were conditional on the donee paying the
resulting gift tax. Because no personal liabilities of the taxpayer were
discharged and because the taxpayer successfully argued that he intended
only a net gift of the value of the property less the gift taxes incurred, the
court concluded that the taxpayer did not realize taxable gain. Levine argued
that Turner, and not Crane, should apply when the donee assumes personal
liabilities of the taxpayer-donor in a part sale, part gift transaction.
In Levine, the Tax Court agreed with the IRS that Crane requires that
gain be recognized in any transaction when the amount of nonrecourse mortgages discharged exceeds the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the encumbered
property. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
the imposition of tax liability by the Tax Court, but expressly refused to
decide if the same result would follow in a pure gift transaction in which the
donee assumed nonrecourse mortgages but no personal liabilities of the
taxpayer-donor were discharged.
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Thus, Levine stands for three important propositions. One, application
of the net gift theory is limited to the facts of Turner. Two, Crane requires
recognition of gain in part sale, part gift transactions as well as in outright
sales. Three, Cranemay require that gain be recognized in all transactions
when the nonrecourse mortgages discharged exceed the adjusted basis in
the property, including pure gift transactions when no personal liabilities
of the taxpayer-donor are discharged.
CHRIS R. MILTENBERGER

SEXUALLY DISCRIMINATORY WORK ENVIRONMENT
VIOLATES TITLE VII. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Sarah Bundy, an employee of the District of Columbia Department of
Corrections, repeatedly was subjected to the sexual advances of her male
supervisors. She complained about this treatment, pursued her complaint
through the chain of command, and eventually met with the agency director. Her complaint, however, was never investigated. In retaliation for her
complaints, Bundy's supervisors delayed her promotion. Bundy then sought
injunctive relief from the sexual harassment and back pay for the allegedly
improper promotion delay.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia refused
to grant Bundy any relief, concluding that sexual harassment does not constitute discrimination with respect to the "terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment" clause of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
ruling for the first time that an employer violates Title VII merely by subjecting female employees to a discriminatory work environment, regardless
of whether the complaining employee loses any benefits as a result of the
discrimination. The court granted Bundy injunctive relief from the sexual
harassment and remanded the claim for back pay.
Based on its prior decision in Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.
1977), the Bundy court readily concluded that Bundy's employer
discriminated against her on the basis of sex. In Barnes, a female employee's
job was abolished following her rejection of her superior's advances. In finding that Barnes' employer had violated Title VII, the court rejected the argument that sexual harassment is not sex discrimination, ruling that the
statutory prohibition of sex discrimination in employment is not limited to
characteristics peculiar to one gender or to situations in which less than all
employees of the claimant's gender are affected. The Barnes court found
that the harassment was a condition of employment because Barnes lost her
job as a result of refusing her. supervisor's advances. The Bundy court extended its decision in Barnes, concluding that "conditions of employment"
include the psychological work environment and that the harassment she
endured caused Bundy anxiety and illegally poisoned that environment. The
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court warned that if the Barnes holding were not extended, an employer could
sexually harass an employee with impunity as long as he took no job-related
action against her.
Bundy v. Jacksonexpands Title VII sex discrimination to include any sexual harassment that has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive work environment. A female employee need not show that she
resisted the harassment or that her resistance resulted in the loss of a jobrelated benefit. Instead, if she proves that her employer subjected her to sexual harassment and to a discriminatory work environment, she is entitled
to injunctive relief.
JEFFREY JOSEPH BRINKER
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